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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
State ex rel. Martin v. Melott: The Separation of
Powers and the Power to Appoint
To the founding fathers the doctrine of separation of powers, the "sacred
maxim of free government," prevented the accumulation of all governmental
power in the same hands-"the very definition of tyranny." '1 Both federal and
North Carolina courts have recognized the doctrine's crucial role in preventing
abuses of power. 2 Although the division of power between making, enforcing,
and interpreting the law is established, the power to appoint public officials does
not fall clearly within any of these divisions. In State ex rel. Martin v. Melott 3
the North Carolina Supreme Court examined the relationship between the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine and the highly coveted power to appoint. The Martin
court ruled that the general assembly could.require the chief justice of the North
Carolina Supreme Court to appoint the head of the Office of Administrative
Hearings (OAH).
This Note examines the separation of powers doctrine and its incorporation
into the federal and North Carolina constitutions. It also examines the evolu-
tion of the appointments provision in the North Carolina Constitution. The
Note concludes that although the Martin court's decision can be reconciled with
the separation of powers doctrine, the court's rationale ignores precedent and
fails to provide a standard by which to judge future legislation. By concentrat-
ing only on the power to appoint, and considering neither the independent prin-
ciple of separation of powers nor the nature of the appointee's power, the court
weakened the system of checks and balances inherent in the separation of pow-
ers. This Note suggests a rationale for deciding such cases that recognizes the
need for checks on governmental power while accommodating effective
government.
In 1985 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted legislation4 provid-
ing that the chief justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court would appoint
the director of the OAH.5 Chief Justice Branch appointed Robert Melott, who
took office on January 1, 1986.6 Governor James G. Martin 7 subsequently filed
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
2. E.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3186 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121
(1976); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613-14 (1952); State ex rel Wallace
v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 600-01, 286 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1982).
3. 320 N.C. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987).
4. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1012 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-752 (1986)).
5. Martin, 320 N.C. at 518-19, 359 S.E.2d at 784. The act called for the Speaker of the House
and President of the Senate to seek an advisory opinion from the North Carolina Supreme Court on
the statute's constitutionality. It also specified that if the supreme court held the appointment provi-
sion to be unconstitutional, the appointment was to made by the Attorney General instead of the
chief justice. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, §§ 18-19, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1017.
The supreme court declined to issue an advisory opinion. See In re Advisory Opinion, 314 N.C.
679, 335 S.E.2d 890 (1985).
6. Martin, 320 N.C. at 519, 359 S.E.2d at 784.
7. Governor Martin took office in January 1985.
1988] 1109
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
suit, challenging the constitutionality of the appointment.8
Governor Martin claimed that the statute violated three provisions of the
North Carolina Constitution.9 He first argued that the statute violated Clause 8
of Article III, Section 5, which defines the Governor's appointment duties. 10
The Governor also claimed that because the OAH is in the executive branch, the
general assembly cannot constitutionally place the power to appoint the OAH
head outside the executive branch.' 1 The appointment allegedly infringed on his
executive powers, thereby violating two general constitutional provisions that
provide for the separation of powers 12 and for the Governor's executive
power. 13
The trial court upheld the appointments and denied the Governor's request
for relief.14 Governor Martin bypassed the court of appeals and appealed di-
rectly to the supreme court.' 5 The supreme court affirmed.' 6 All justices hear-
ing the case17 held that the statute did not violate the appointments provision.18
A plurality of three justices concluded that the director's appointment was not
an executive act, and therefore neither violated the separation of powers princi-
ple nor infringed upon the Governor's power.' 9
The two concurring justices' primary concern was the plurality's examina-
tion of only the nature of the appointment power.20 After examining Melott's
duties, they concluded that his position was quasi-judicial and within the chief
justice's power to appoint.2 1 Justice Harry Martin dissented, arguing Melott's
duties were administrative, and an appointment from outside the executive
branch therefore violated the separation of powers doctrine.22
8. Martin, 320 N.C. at 518-19, 359 S.E.2d at 784.
9. Id.
10. The appointments clause provides, "The Governor shall nominate and by and with the
advice and consent of the majority of the Senators appoint all officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for." N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5, cl. 8.
11. Martin, 320 N.C. at 522-23, 359 S.E.2d at 786.
12. Id. at 522, 359 S.E.2d at 786. Article I, Section 6 provides, "The legislative, executive, and
supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each
other." N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
13. Martin, 320 N.C. at 522-23, 359 S.E.2d at 786. Article III, Section 1 provides, "The execu-
tive power of the State shall be vested in the Governor." N.C. CONST. art III, § 1.
14. Martin, 320 N.C. at 519, 359 S.E.2d at 784. Governor Martin had asked the court first for
a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional and second for the removal of Melott in
a quo warranto proceeding challenging Melott's right to the office. Id.
15. Id. The Governor petitioned the supreme court pursuant to Section 7A-31 of the North
Carolina General Statutes and Rule 15(a) of the Norti Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which allow an appellant to bypass the court of appeals at the discretion of the supreme court. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1986); N.C.R. App. P. 15(a).
16. Martin, 320 N.C. at 524, 359 S.E.2d at 787 (plurality opinion).
17. Chief Justice Exum did not participate in the decision, presumably because of his poten-
tially conflicting interest in the outcome. See id.
18. See id. at 522, 359 S.E.2d at 786 (plurality opinion); id. at 525, 359 S.E.2d at 787 (Meyer, J.,
concurring); id. at 528, 359 S.E.2d at 789 (Martin, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 524, 359 S.E.2d at 787.
20. Id. at 525, 359 S.E.2d at 788 (Meyer, J., concurring). Justice Whichard joined in Justice
Meyer's concurrence.
21. Id. (Meyer, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 529, 359 S.E.2d at 790 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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After deciding that someone other than the Governor could appoint the
director, the Martin court decided whether the chief justice could do so. The
Governor argued that the OAH, an executive agency, could not be headed by
the chief justice's appointee without violating the separation of powers. 23 Rea-
soning from a previous holding, the plurality rejected this argument. 24 Because
appointing is not an entirely executive function, it reasoned, the constitution
does not require that the appointer be in the executive branch. The general
assembly may therefore provide that the chief justice will appoint the director. 25
The concurring justices reached the same conclusion but on different rea-
soning. They concentrated on the director's powers, finding them "predomi-
nantly judicial," and ruled the chief justice would be exercising judicial power
by appointing the director.26 Justice Martin agreed with the concurring justices'
standard, but disagreed with its application by the concurring justices in this
case.27 He held that Melott's powers were administrative and therefore the ex-
ecutive branch must appoint him. 28 Justice Martin observed that though the
director has "quasi-judicial" powers, such are commonplace for administrative
agencies. 29 He also argued that because the general assembly may not create a
new court, 30 the powers of the OAH must not be judicial.3 '
Separating the powers of government is fundamental to American democ-
racy. Though the federal constitution does not refer to the separation of powers,
the framers incorporated it by assigning distinct functions to the three branches
of government.3 2 In so doing, the framers sought to strike a balance between
checks on the power of government and effective government. 33 Just as the im-
23. Id. at 518-19, 359 S.E.2d at 784.
24. Id. at 523-24, 359 S.E.2d at 787 (plurality opinion) (citing In re Separation of Powers, 305
N.C. 767, 774, 295 S.E.2d 589, 593 (1982)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 525, 359 S.E.2d at 788 (Meyer, J., concurring). Justice Meyer wrote, "I agree ... that
the legislature can constitutionally delegate to the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme
Court the power to appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings ...." Id. (empha-
sis added). The use of the word "delegate" in this context is troubling. Delegation connotes subor-
dination, which is inconsistent with the parity of the three branches. It also implies that the person
delegating can retake the authority if she wishes. "Delegation" is often used to describe the grant of
authority to an administrative agency. See infra text accompanying note 36. However, it is appro-
priate in that context because the general assembly created the agency. The constitution created the
North Carolina Supreme Court. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
27. Martin, 320 N.C. at 530-31, 359 S.E.2d at 790-91 (Martin, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 531, 359 S.E.2d at 791 (Martin, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 530, 359 S.E.2d at 790. See also Cox v. City of Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252
(1940) (quasi-judicial powers may be granted to administrative agencies to aid them in executing
their assigned responsibilities).
30. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The General Assembly shall have no power to ... establish
or authorize any courts other than as permitted by this Article.").
31. Martin, 320 N.C. at 531, 359 S.E.2d at 791 (Martin, J., dissenting).
32. See Orth, "Forever Separate and Distinct" Separation of Powers in North Carolina, 62
N.C.L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1983). For a thorough discussion of the origins and history of the separation of
powers doctrine, see Fairlie, The Separation of Powers, 21 MICH. L. REv. 393 (1922); Sharp, Classi-
cal American Doctrine of the Separation of Powers, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 385 (1935).
33. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, I., concurring).
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peachment, war-making, and spending powers of the Congress diminish the
threat of an autocratic executive, fear of a despotic legislature helps explain bi-
cameralism, 34 the independence of the judiciary, 35 judicial review, and presiden-
tial veto. 36 A strong executive was intended to promote efficient government
and prevent tyranny by a majority.37
The founders of North Carolina's Revolutionary government were intent
on separating the powers of government. In its instructions to its delegates to
the North Carolina Provincial Congress of 1776, Mecklenburg County in-
structed that they
endeavor that the Government shall be so formed that [governmental
power] shall be divided into three branches distinct from each other,
viz: The power of making laws
The power of executing laws
The power of Judging.3 8
Accordingly, the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided that "the legis-
lative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government, ought to be for-
ever separate and distinct from each other." 39
Though the North Carolina and federal constitutions both provided for the
separation of powers, the two constitutions differed in the relative power of each
branch. Demonstrating an historic fear of powerful executives, 40 North Caro-
lina constitutions have given more power to the general assembly than to the
Governor. For example, under the Constitution of 1776, the general assembly
elected both the Governor and the justices of the supreme court.41 The general
political power of the state has been vested in the general assembly, limited only
34. See Sharp, supra note 32, at 396-98. Sharp quotes John Adams, who wrote in defense of
bicameralism, "A single assembly is liable to all the vices, follies, and frailties of an individual ....
[A] single assembly, possessed of all the powers of government, would make arbitrary laws for their
own interest, execute all laws arbitrarily for their own interest, and adjudge all controversies in their
own favor." Id.; see also Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(statute permitting one house of Congress to reverse an administrative decision violates constitu-
tional requirements of bicameral deliberation and of presentment of bills to the President for possible
veto).
35. See Sharp, supra note 32, at 393. Professor Sharp suggests that the independent judiciary
was the result of the wealthy framers of the constitution wishing to protect their property from an
unchecked legislature. Id.
36. Sharp, supra note 32, at 385.
37. Sharp, supra note 32, at 399. "It was the the prevailing view that legislatures were danger-
ous, and ought not to be too strong, while executives and judges would be likely to protect endan-
gered interests, and ought to be strong." Id. For a criticism of the growth in executive power, see
Miller, Separation of Power: An Ancient Doctrine Under Modern Challenge, 28 ADMIN. L. REV.
299, 313-18 (1976).
38. State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 596-98, 286 S.E.2d 79, 82-83 (1982) (quoting
10 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 870b (W. Saunders ed. 1890)). For more back-
ground on concerns about the separation of powers during the writing of the constitution of 1776,
see Orth, supra note 32, at 3-6.
39. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 4.
40. See H. LEFLER & A. NEWsOME, NORTH CAROLINA: THE HISTORY OF A SOUTHERN
STATE 210 (3d ed. 1973).
41. Cunningham v. Springle, 124 N.C. 638, 642-43, 33 S.E. 138, 139 (1899). The constitution
was amended in 1835 to provide for the popular election of the Governor. The Constitution of 1868
provided for the popular election of the judiciary. See Orth, supra note 32, at 6 (discussing predomi-
nance of the legislature in the early constitutions of southern states).
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by the state and federal constitutions.42
In North Carolina most separation of powers litigation has tested the au-
thority of administrative agencies either to promulgate or to enforce rules, or has
challenged the authority of the agency to do both.43 The issue in these cases has
been the extent to which a delegation of power by the general assembly to an
administrative agency violates the separation of powers doctrine.
Typical of such cases is Motsinger v. Peryman.44 As a defense to a work-
ers' compensation claim, defendant challe'nged the authority of the Industrial
Commission to require insurers to notify the Commission ten days before cancel-
ling a policy.45 The supreme court held that the commission had violated the
separation of powers principle by making law instead of simply enforcing it.46
Though the court held that the general assembly could not delegate its power to
make laws, the court observed that "[t]he authority to make rules and regula-
tions to carry out express legislative purposes or effect the operation and
enforcement of a law is not an exclusively legislative power, but is rather admin-
istrative in its nature and may be delegated." 47 In further defining which pow-
ers could be delegated, the court declared that "any power not legislative in
character, which the legislature may exercise, it may delegate."'48
The extent to which. the general assembly may delegate to the courts is
unclear. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that it has no power or
authority to oversee administrative agencies. 49 Although judicial power and ad-
ministrative power in one agency could violate the separation of powers doc-
42. Sykes v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 398, 402, 163 S.E.2d 775, 778 (1968); Mitchell v. North Caro-
lina Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750 (1968).
43. See, eg., Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683,
249 S.E.2d 402 (1978) (delegation of power to Coastal Resources Commission did not violate separa-
tion of powers); Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971) (granting parole board
judicial powers is constitutional).
One commentator suggested that the separation of powers should not be a consideration in
administrative law. Fuchs, An Approach to Administrative Law, 18 N.C.L. REV. 183, 198 (1940)
("The dead weight of alleged separation-of-powers limitations should be cast overboard finally and
definitively, bag and baggage.").
44. 218 N.C. 15, 9 S.E.2d 511 (1940).
45. Id. at 19, 9 S.E.2d at 514.
46. Id. at 20, 9 S.E.2d at 515.
47. Id. at 20, 9 S.E.2d at 514-15.
48. Id.; see also, Foster v. North Carolina Medical Care Comm'n, 283 N.C. 110, 195 S.E.2d 517
(1973) ("The General Assembly may neither abdicate its authority to make law nor delegate that
authority to other departments of government or subordinate administrative agencies."); Guthrie v.
Taylor, 279 N.C. 703, 712-13, 185 S.E.2d 193, 200 (1971) (general assembly may delegate rule-
making power, but it must provide standards within which the agency will operate; however, the
agency may exercise complete discretion if its authority is derived directly from the constitution),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972).
Though the constitution defines the legislature's powers, this seldom resolves these claims. One
commentator has suggested that "legislation. . . 'consists of an abstract formulation of a general
rule' while adjudication 'operates concretely upon individuals in their individual capacity.'" Fuchs,
supra note 43, at 192 (quoting C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 238 (1927); J. DICKINSON, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1926)). Fuchs also
suggests distinguishing between the powers and the functions of a branch of government. Fuchs,
supra note 43, at 186.
49. See Burton v. City of Reidsville, 243 N.C. 405, 90 S.E.2d 700 (1956).
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trine, the supreme court ruled in Cox v. City of Kinston 50 that the general
assembly may create a board with both quasi-judicial 5l and administrative
power and delegate power to it.s 2 In Cox the court upheld a statute authorizing
the creation of the Kinston Housing Authority, saying, "The legislature has al-
ways, without serious question, given quasi-judicial powers to administrative
bodies in aid of duties assigned to them .... The performance of quasi-judicial
and [administrative] duties by the same board violates no implication of [the
separation of powers clause]." '53
Statutes that purport to authorize legislators to exercise executive powers
violate the separation of powers doctrine. In In re Separation of Powers5 4 the
justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court considered statutes that author-
ized a joint legislative commission to make budgetary decisions.55 The justices
ruled that under the statutes the committee would "administer the budget," a
power the constitution gave exclusively to the Governor.5 6 This legislative exer-
cise of executive power violated the separation of powers doctrine.5 7
Similarly, a statute authorizing the appointment of legislators to an admin-
istrative body has been held unconstitutional. In State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone58
50. 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1§40).
51. "Quasi-judicial" is a term applied to "the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discre-
tion ofajudicial nature." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1121 (5th ed. 1979). One court has held that
issuing advisory opinions is not quasi-judicial, because the issuing of the opinion was not the basis of
the issuing board's official action. Commission on Ethics v. Sullivan, 489 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1986). For
a survey of the criticisms of the term "quasi-judicial," see Note, The Administrative Hearing Com-
mission and the Separation of Powers" A Solution to an Old Problem, 49 Mo. L. Rav. 854, 861-62
(1984).
52. Cox, 217 N.C. at 394-95, 8 S.E.2d at 256.
53. Id.
54. 305 N.C. 767, 295 S.E.2d 589 (1982). The Governor, the Speaker of the House, and the
President of the Senate had requested the North Carolina Supreme Court to issue an advisory opin-
ion on the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 772, 295 S.E.2d at 592. An advisory opinion is not
an opinion of the court, but is rather the justices giving their collective, but nonbinding opinions. In
re Advisory Opinion, 314 N.C. 679, 335 S.E.2d 890 (1985).
55. In re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 768-71, 295 S.E.2d at 590-91. The statutes permit-
ted the commission to make budget transfers between agencies up to 10% as needed during the fiscal
year and to allocate federal block grants. Id.
56. -d. at 776-77, 779, 295 S.E.2d at 594, 596. The court relied on Clause 3 of Article III,
Section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution, which provides that "[t]he budget as enacted by the
General Assembly shall be administered by the Governor."
57. In re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 776-77, 295 S.E.2d at 594. The justices also de-
clared that a statute authorizing the joint commission to control block grants was "an unlawful
delegation of legislative power." Id. at 780, 295 S.E.2d at 596. The justices did not explain why this
was unlawful. The delegation of legislative power to a group of legislators would not seem to violate
separation of powers, as the power remains in the legislative branch. See Orth, supra note 32, at 23.
One justification for nullifying this delegation is that it bypassed constitutional checks on arbi-
trary legislative action, particularly bicameral deliberation and consent. See supra note 34 and ac-
companying text; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3205 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(statute permitting comptroller general, an official removable only by Congress, to cut federal spend-
ing violates the constitutional procedure for law-making). For a criticism of the court's rationale in
In re Separation of Powers, see Orth, supra note 32, at 22-23.
58. 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E.2d 79 (1982). For an historical backdrop to Wallace, see Orth,
Separation of Powers: An Old Doctrine Triggers a New Crisis, N.C. INSIGHT, May 1982, at 36.
Professor Orth documents six incursions by one branch of the government into the domain of
another.
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two members of the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission
(EMC), both of whom were appointed by the Governor, challenged a statute
that authorized legislative appointments to the EMC.59 After examining the
duties of the EMC, the court struck the statute, stating "it is crystal clear to us
that the duties of the EMC are administrative or executive in character and have
no relation to the function of the legislative branch of government. . . ."6 The
Wallace court's primary concern was legislative control of the agency by the
appointment of legislators to the EMC.61 The court did not reach the question
of whether appointments by legislators to the EMC would be constitutional. 62
The overarching concern of the supreme court in both Wallace and In re
Advisory Opinion was legislative usurpation of executive power. In In re Advi-
sory Opinion the legislative incursion was direct: legislators performed executive
functions. In Wallace the legislative control was less direct because only a mi-
nority of the EMC's members were legislators. The Court nevertheless held that
the legislators had invaded the Governor's powers.
In addition to violating the general separation of powers doctrine, an ap-
pointment may be unconstitutional because it violates a more specific provision
for appointments. The appointments provision of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion, often reflecting the contemporary political landscape, has evolved over 200
years. Under the Constitution of 1776, for example, the general assembly ap-
pointed all of the state's judges and elected the Governor.63
During Reconstruction, the federal government imposed the Constitution
of 1868.64 This constitution explicitly gave the Governor the power to fill posi-
tions that the general assembly created and barred the general assembly from
making the appointments itself.65 The North Carolina Supreme Court alluded
59. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 591-92, 286 S.E.2d at 79-80. The statute permitted both the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate to appoint two members to the
EMC.
60. Id. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88. The court relied on the purpose of the EMC, as stated in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143B-282 (1987), to "promulgate rules and regulations to be followed in the protec-
tion, preservation, and enhancement of the water and air resources of the State." The court then
gave a litany of the specific powers of the EMC. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 607, 286 S.E.2d at 87-88.
61. Id. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88. "The legislature cannot constitutionally create a special instru-
mentality of government to implement specific legislation and then retain some control over the
process of implementation by appointing legislators to the governing body of the instrumentality."
Id.
62. The court did not comment on the 49 other boards and commissions on which legislators
serve pursuant to statute. See id. The court did, however, acknowledge, "North Carolina has recog-
nized and benefitted from cooperative efforts between the branches of its government. The best
examples of this are various study commissions on which legislators and non-legislators, including
persons from other branches of government, have served." Id. The EMC's active enforcment of the
law, rather than its being a study commission, was a basis of the court's decision. Id. For the
legislative response to Wallace, see Heath, The Separation of Powers in North Carolina, POPULAR
Gov'T, Fall 1982, at 19, 22-23; Sawyer, The Separation of Powers in North Carolina-A 1984 Up-
date, POPULAR Gov'T, Winter 1984, at 29.
63. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
64. See 2 R. CONNOR, NORTH CAROLINA: REBUILDING AN ANCIENT COMMONWEALTH 325
(1929).
65. The 1868 constitution provided that:
The Governor shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of a majority of the
Senators-elect, appoint all officers whose offices are established by this Constitution, or
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to this provision in People ex rel. Cloud v. Wilson,6 6 and noted that the constitu-
tion empowered the Governor to make appointments absent a specific constitu-
tional provision to the contrary. 67
The end of Reconstruction returned the Democrats to power, bringing con-
stitutional reform and a shift of power from the Governor back to the general
assembly.6 8 The new appointments clause did not specifically bar legislative
appointments, and it did not specifically provide for the Governor to fill offices
created by law. 69 Interpreting this provision, the supreme court ruled that the
Governor's power to fill positions created by statute could be limited by
statute.
70
The North Carolina Constitution was largely rewritten in 1970. The new
appointments clause reads, "The Governor shall nominate and by and with the
advice and consent of the majority of the Senators appoint all officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for."'7 1 No appellate court in North
Carolina has interpreted this provision, and it is unclear whether this revision
makes a substantive change. On one hand, dropping the requirement that an
appointment be of officers "whose offices are established by the Constitution" 72
seems to broaden the Governor's power under the provision. On the other hand,
retaining the phrase "whose appointments are not otherwise provided for" sug-
gests approval of the previous judicial interpretation of that phrase, which per-
mitted the general assembly to provide for appointments through statutes. 73
which shall be created by law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for, and
no such officer shall be appointed or elected by the General Assembly.
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 10 (emphasis added).
66. 72 N.C. 155 (1875).
67. Id. at 158. The Cloud court considered the constitutionality of a statute which called for
elections to fill vacant judgeships. Id. at 155-56. Cloud was appointed to the vacancy by Governor
Holden, a Republican, who was later removed from office by a predominantly Democratic general
assembly. Id. In striking the statute, the court relied primarily on provisions which authorized the
Governor to fill judicial vacancies, but the court also referred to "other parts of the Constitution"
which empowered the Governor to appoint absent a contrary constitutional provision. Id. at 158.
68. See R. CONNOR, supra note 64, at 343.
69. The appointments clause, as amended in 1875, read, "The Governor shall nominate, and
by and with the advice and consent of a majority of the Senators-elect, appoint all officers whose
offices are established by this Constitution and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for."
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 10 (1875).
70. Salisbury v. Croom, 167 N.C. 223, 226, 83 S.E. 354, 355 (1914); State ex rL Cherry v.
Burns, 124 N.C. 761, 765, 33 S.E. 136, 137 (1899). Commenting on the changes wrought by the
1875 amendments, the Salisbury court wrote:
It will thus be noted that the inhibition on the legislative power to appoint to office is
removed and the inherent power of the Governor to appoint is restricted to constitutional
offices and where the Constitution itself so provides. Accordingly, it has since been the
accepted view that, in all offices created by statute.., the power of appointment.., is
subject to legislative provision as expressed in a valid enactment.
Salisbury, 167 N.C. at 226, 83 S.E. at 355.
In Cunningham v. Sprinkle, 124 N.C. 406, 33 S.E. 138 (1899), the court determined whether a
reference to the agriculture board in the constitution made it a constitutional office. In holding that
it did not, the court stated that the provision "'[t]he General Assembly shall establish a Department
of Agriculture' "did not establish the board; it simply directed the general assembly to do so. Id. at
409, 33 S.E. at 139 (quoting N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 17 (1875)).
71. N.C. CoNsT. art. III, § 5, cl. 8.
72. See supra note 69.
73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. The North Carolina Supreme Court has not
1116 [Vol. 66
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Martin is significant because it is the first case interpreting the appoint-
ments clause of the 1970 constitution. As such, it may be a standard by which
subsequent disputes between branches of government will be resolved. Specifi-
cally, by reaffirming that the phrase "unless otherwise provided" means "unless
otherwise provided by constitution or statute," Martin establishes that the gen-
eral assembly may designate who will make appointments, absent a specific pro-
vision to the contrary.74 The plurality's broad declaration of the appointment
power's mobility between branches further suggests little scrutiny of such legis-
lative enactments in the future. 75
The court also reaffirmed that the Constitution of 1970 made few substan-
tive changes. The court's silence on the dropping of the phrase "whose offices
are established by this Constitution" suggests the court is hesitant to recognize
changes in the 1970 constitution even though revised language suggests other-
wise.7 6 Perhaps the most significant aspect of the case is the court's very limited
view of the separation of powers doctrine as an independent bar to certain legis-
lative acts.7 7 Indeed, the court's language suggests the doctrine is no bar to the
general assembly's creating an appointment power outside the executive
branch.78
The precedential value of the Martin holding is unclear because of its lack
of a majority opinion. Though all six justices rejected the Governor's appoint-
ments clause argument, the justices split three-to-three on the proper emphasis
of their separation of powers inquiry.79 The plurality asked if the power to ap-
point was a purely executive power; the other justices examined the appointee's
been consistent on the extent to which substantive changes were made in the Constitution of 1970.
In North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 304 N.C. 627, 286 S.E.2d 89 (1982), the court ruled that
"[the 1970 constitution] was not a fundamentally new constitution. It was an extensive editorial
revision .... The evils sought to be remedied were obsolete language, outdated style, and illogical
arrangement .. . . Important and significant substantive changes were not included in the new
document submitted in 1970." Id. at 636-37, 286 S.E.2d at 95. However, in Smith v. State, 289
N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976), the supreme court ruled that the 1970 revisons had wrought sub-
stantive changes by enlarging the original jurisdiction of the supreme court. Id. at 325, 222 S.E.2d at
428.
74. See supra notes 5-18 and accompanying text.
75. Differences among the appointment provisions of state constitutions make generalizations
of their case law difficult. Many state constitutions provide that the Governor will make appoint-
ments unless the constitution provides otherwise. See, eg., KY. CoNST. § 76 ("He [the Governor]
shall have the power, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, to fill vacancies by granting
commissions .. "). In most such states, making appointments is considered an executive function
that neither the legislature nor judiciary may exercise. See Legislative Research Comm'n ex rel.
Prather v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 923-24 (Ky. 1984).
In states where constitutions permit the legislature to specify how appointments are to be made,
most courts scrutinize statutes to ensure that the legislature is not encroaching on executive or judi-
cial perogatives. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 596, 14 N.E.2d 465 (1938); State ex reL
Hadley v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680, 67 S.W. 592 (1902) (en banc); Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674
(Utah 1982). The Hadley court found that legislative appointments of one who executed the laws,
though apparently authorized by the appointments provision, violated the separation of powers doc-
trine. Hadley, 167 Mo. at 694, 67 S.W. at 594. However, some courts, viewing the power to appoint
as neither legislative or executive, do not scrutinize such legislative enactments. Sarten v. Snell, 87
Kan. 485, 125 P. 47 (1912).
76. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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power. Justice Martin's disagreement with the concurring justices on how to
apply their test permitted Justice Webb's opinion to garner a plurality.
The court's interpretation of the current appointments clause is consistent
with its interpretation of the appointments clause in the 1875 amendments to the
Constitution of 1868. Though the 1970 amendment apparently increased the
Governor's power to appoint,80 the court correctly repeated its holding that the
"unless otherwise provided" clause permits the general assembly to assign that
power elsewhere. 81 The clear intent of the 1875 revisionists-to permit the gen-
eral assembly to designate how appointments are made-should be given effect
absent a clear change in the 1970 constitution.8 2
The court's analysis of the Governor's separation of powers claim, however,
is inconsistent with its previous decisions. The Governor had asserted that be-
cause Melott's responsibilities were administrative, the general assembly's place-
ment of the power to appoint outside the executive branch violated the
separation of powers doctrine.83 The court responded by stating that because
the power to appoint is not exclusively executive, the general assembly could
give the power to whomever it wished. 84
The Martin court's concentration on the appointments provision, divorced
from the separation of powers provision, is inconsistent with Wallace.8" The
Wallace court did not hold that the legislative appointments to the EMC vio-
lated any specific constitutional provision. 86 Instead, the appointments violated
only the general separation of powers clause. Martin's implicit requirement that
a specific power be infringed is irreconcilable.8 7
As Justice Meyer wrote in his concurring opinion, the focus should be on
the '!powers and duties exercised by the person appointed."8 8 Justice Meyer
continued:
If the nature of the powers and duties to be exercised by the appointee
are primarily executive in nature, the separation of powers provision of
our constitution is violated [by granting the power to the chief justice].
If they are primarily judicial in nature, the separation of powers provi-
sion is not violated.8 9
80. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
81. Martin, 320 N.C. at 523, 359 S.E.2d at 785. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of the motives behind and effects of the 1875 amendments, see supra note
70 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the intentions of the drafters of the 1970 constitution,
see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
83. Martin, 320 N.C. at 522-23, 359 S.E.2d at 786.
84. Id. at 523-24, 359 S.E.2d at 787.
85. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
86. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 608-09, 286 S.E.2d at 89.
87. In re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 295 S.E.2d 589 (1982), did not weaken Wallace's
applicability here. In In re Separation of Powers, the justices held that because a statute encroached
upon the Governor's budgetary powers under Article III, it violated the separation of powers. Id. at
776-77, 295 S.E.2d at 594. The ruling implied that an encroachment upon a specific power is suffi-
cdent to violate the principle of separation of powers, but did not imply that such an encroachment is
necessary. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
88. Martin, 320 N.C. at 525, 359 S.E.2d at 788 (Meyer, J., concurring).
89. Id.
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Wallace supports Justice Meyer's objection to the plurality's rationale. In
holding the appointment of the legislators to the EMC unconstitutional, the
Wallace court wrote "the duties of the EMC are administrative or executive in
character and have no relation to the function of legislative branch of govern-
ment, which is to make laws." 90 Although the issue in Wallace clearly differs
from that in Martin, both cases turn on the need to consider the appointee's
powers when judging the constitutionalty of appointments. Similarly, the jus-
tices in In re Separation of Powers focused on the appointees' powers when re-
viewing the propriety of appointing legislators to a commission with executive
powers.9 1 The justices reaffirmed Wallace, basing their decision on the appoin-
tees' authority and the need to limit legislative control of the executive branch. 92
Justice Meyer's concurring opinion in Martin implicitly recognized that an
appointment could violate the separation of powers provision without violating
the appointments clause. Justice Meyer did not differ with the plurality's inter-
pretation of the appointments clause. Nevertheless, he opined that in certain
circumstances, the appointee's functions could make an otherwise valid appoint-
ment invalid. Because neither the appointments clause itself nor the plurality's
interpretation of the clause incorporates the appointee's function, Justice Meyer
must have been alluding to the general separation of powers doctrine.93
The court's unsupported remark that "[t]he appointment of someone to
execute the laws does not require the appointing party to execute the laws" 94 is
utterly inconsistent with the separation of powers in the federal constitution. 95
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that maintaining the power to
appoint the officials within each branch is crucial to each branch's
independence.9 6
In discussing the general assembly's grant of authority to the chief justice to
appoint the OAH director, the court did not address the constitutionality of
requiring the chief justice to make such appointments. While the question has
not been presented in North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court has
ruled that Congress may not impose executive or administrative duties on a
90. Wallace, 304 N.C. at 608, 286 S.E.2d at 88. The Martin plurality considered Wallace, but
held it to be inapposite because it concerned appointing legislators to commissions rather than the
general assembly designating who would appoint. Martin, 320 N.C. at 523, 359 S.E.2d at 786.
91. In re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 776, 295 S.E.2d at 594.
92. Id. at 776-77, 295 S.E.2d at 594. Interestingly, the Martin court cited In re Separation of
Powers, which held the general assembly could not interfere with the Governor's administration of
the budget, for the proposition that the Governor's powers were limited to "executing laws." Mar-
tin, 320 N.C. at 523, 359 S.E.2d at 787 (quoting In re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 774, 295
S.E.2d 589, 593 (1982)).
93. Martin, 320 N.C. at 527, 359 S.E.2d at 789 (Meyer, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 523, 359 S.E.2d at 787.
95. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163 (1926) ("The power to appoint and remove execu-
tive officers is an exercise of executive power."); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3188
(1986) (Executive power may not be exercised by one whom Congress could remove because "the
structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress
cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess."). But cf, Humphrey's Execu-
tor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (only the President may remove or appoint officials, but
Congress may create standards for removal if officials' functions are "quasi-legislative").
96. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188; Myers, 272 U.S. at 163.
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judge.97 Justice Meyer's assertion in Martin that Melott's duties were "predom-
inately judicial"98 does not resolve the issue entirely, because Melott's duties
were partially administrative.
Justices Martin and Meyer differ on whether the OAH was judicial or ad-
ministrative, and both make strong arguments. The statutory definition of
OAH's duties includes functions that are administrative as well as those nor-
mally considered judicial.99 Some functions are not clearly within either
branch. 1°° However, because a statute must be clearly unconstitutional before
the court will strike it,10 1 the court properly upheld the statute.
The concurring opinion's emphasis on the powers that the appointee will
exercise is more consistent with the court's earlier cases.10 2 Furthermore, the
plurality's analysis stops after establishing that the power to appoint has not
been misplaced. By concentrating on the power to appoint, the plurality refuses
to give the separation of powers doctrine an independent existence. Under this
analysis, violating this principle is an epithet for one branch's encroachment on
the specific powers of another.
Though the court's conclusion is defensible, its rationale poses several
problems. The most serious difficulty is that it undermines the independent
strength of the separation of powers principle, the purpose of which is to prevent
the weakening of one branch of government. By narrowly viewing this doctrine,
the court diminishes an important check on unbridled power.
The decision also offers no guidelines for future legislation. By concentra-
ting on the power to appoint, which it views as neither legislative nor executive,
the court permits the general assembly to grant to any person, or to keep to
itself, all appointments not provided for in the constitution. This power opens
the door for legislative hegemony, threatening the integrity of the executive and
judicial branches. Weakening the separation of powers doctrine may also dimin-
97. See United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 51 (1852).
98. Martin, 320 N.C. at 526, 359 S.E.2d at 788 (Meyer, J., concurring).
99. For example, the director is responsible for codifying and publishing all administrative
rules, as well as hearing testimony, applying rules of evidence, and regulating discovery. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 150B-33 (1987).
100. The director of OAH is the chief administrative law judge. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-751
(1986). Whether one considers this a judicial or executive position may turn on the relative empha-
sis one gives the words "law judge'" and "administrative." See Note, supra note 51, at 859 (Some
courts rely on procedural similarities between the agency and the courts in assessing whether or not
the agency violates the separation of powers doctrine.).
101. See Glenn v. Board of Educ., 210 N.C. 525, 187 S.E.2d 781 (1936). In a dispute between
the Governor and general assembly, why should a presumption favor the general assembly? One
could argue that the relative weakness of the Governor behooves the court to compensate in order to
check legislative abuses. By simply abandoning its strong presumption in favor of legislative acts
when the Governor alleges they violate the separation of powers, the court could promote parity.
One answer is that the general assembly is vested with all political power in the state except when
limited by the constitution. This reflects the notion that the general assembly more accurately repre-
sents popular will. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text (documenting the historical fear of a strong executive). While this was undoubtedly true
when the general assembly appointed the Governor, it is less evident with a popularly elected Gover-
nor. Indeed, one could argue that because only a small fraction of the electorate votes for any one
legislator, the Governor is more attuned to the popular will.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
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ish the effectiveness of government.' 0 3 Each branch, in order to perform its
duties effectively, depends on appointees to execute their duties consistent with
its policies.1t 4 Therefore, the selection of the appointee is crucial to each
branch's effectiveness.
A better approach would accommodate the competing policy demands of
effectiveness and an effective check on excessive power. Because the need to
provide effective checks and balances is the foundation of the constitution and
transcends any particular provision, the separation of powers provision should
also be seen to transcend any other particular provision. Under this view, acts
that encroach on the general powers of one branch would be struck even though
they violate no other specific provision. Although this view was implicit in Wal-
lace and in the Martin concurrence, s05 the failure to state it explicitly may ex-
plain the Martin plurality's departure from it.
While the separation of powers should have an independent identity, the
power to appoint should be viewed as a tool which each branch employs in
performing its constitutional duties. 10 6 Under this rationale, the appointment of
an official with executive powers would be an integral component of the ap-
pointer's executive power. An appointment of this official by someone outside
the executive branch would therefore place executive power outside the execu-
tive branch. Thus understood, a court reviewing an appointment would focus
on whether the powers of the appointee were a subset of the powers of the ap-
pointer. 10 7 If the appointer and appointee exercised different types of power,
then the appointment would fail. The result would be that each appointee
would be appointed by one in her own branch.
This formulation seeks to preserve the integrity of each branch by prevent-
ing cross purposes between appointer and appointee. By relating the power to
appoint to the delegation of authority, one avoids the anomaly of an appointee
and his more powerful superior pursuing different objectives.' 08 The scheme
also insulates each branch from the winds of political or policy change in other
branches. 0 9 By forcing either deliberation between the branches or an electoral
consensus, the risk of one branch's political agenda undermining that of another
is diminished. This result is also more consistent with each branch's ultimate
accountability to the electorate. Finally, such a model would guide the general
103. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-2 (1988).
104. Myers, 272 U.S. at 163-64.
105. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
106. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 163. The Myers Court ruled that the separation of powers limits the
power of Congress to interfere with appointments of executive officers. "Otherwise, it would be
impossible for the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." Id. at 163-64.
107. State ex rel Hadley v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680, 691, 67 S.W. 592, 594 (1902) ("[Everyone]
who lawfully exercises any State governmental function is able to trace the sources of his authority
to one of the three departments there named. The power, whatever its character, can be exercised
only by or under the authority of the separate magistracy to which by the Constitution it is
assigned.").
108. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
109. See Miller, Separation of Powers: An Ancient Doctrine Under Modern Challenge, 28 AD-
MIN. L. REv. 299, 303 (1976) (In the liberal state "social change-what some call progress-c
come about only by moves in concert by the three branches.").
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
assembly and courts on the legitimacy of appointments. Though the "subset"
test is no doubt easier to state than to apply, 110 it focuses on factors relevant to
the independence of each branch and discounts the power to appoint as an in-
dependent constitutional prerogative.
In upholding the statute in Martin, the plurality concentrated on the power
to appoint and ignored the independent role of the separations of power doctrine
as a check against the abuse of power. This rationale departs from the court's
previous cases and weakens a constitutional safeguard against the abuse of
power. Furthermore, the court's decision offers no rationale by which appoint-
ment cases can be decided consistently. A rationale which reverses the emphasis
of the plurality would better serve the conflicting interests of or between effective
yet controlled government.
CHARLES HERMAN WINFREE
110. In a case like Martin, in which the appointee's duties are not a proper subset of any one
branch, a court would need to determine the branch into which the appointee's duties predominantly
fall.
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